Propensities and Transcendental Assumptions

Erkenntnis 74 (3):363-381 (2011)
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Abstract

In order to comprehend the world around us and construct explaining theories for this purpose, we need a conception of physical probability, since we come across many (apparently) probabilistic phenomena in our world. But how should we understand objective probability claims? Since pure frequency approaches of probability are not appropriate, we have to use a single case propensity interpretation. Unfortunately, many philosophers believe that this understanding of probability is burdened with significant difficulties. My main aim is to show that we can treat propensity as a theoretical concept that exhibits many similarities to other theoretical concepts, and its difficulties are not insuperable if we make explicit some general presuppositions of scientific practice and apply them to propensities. At least this is true if we formulate the right bridge principle for propensity and rely on further methodological rules in dealing with propensity assertions to make them empirically testable

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2010-11-18

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Thomas Bartelborth
Universität Leipzig

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References found in this work

The Structure of Science.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):275-275.
An introduction to the philosophy of science.Rudolf Carnap - 1974 - New York: Dover Publications. Edited by Martin Gardner.
Why There’s No Cause to Randomize.John Worrall - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):451-488.

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