Proof and uncertainty in causal claims

Exchanges: The Interdisciplinary Research Journal 5 (2) (2018)
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Abstract

Causal questions drive scientific enquiry. From Hume to Granger, and Rubin to Pearl the history of science is full of examples of scientists testing new theories in an effort to uncover causal mechanisms. The difficulty of drawing causal conclusions from observational data has prompted developments in new methodologies, most notably in the area of graphical models. We explore the relationship between existing theories about causal mechanisms in a social science domain, new mathematical and statistical modelling methods, the role of mathematical proof and the importance of accounting for uncertainty. We show that, while the mathematical sciences rely on their modelling assumptions, dialogue with the social sciences calls for continual extension of these models. We show how changing model assumptions lead to innovative causal structures and more nuanced casual explanations. We review differing techniques for determining cause in different disciplines using causal theories from psychology, medicine, and economics.

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The Nature of Explanation.K. J. W. Craik - 1944 - Philosophy 19 (73):173-174.
Theory of Algorithms.A. A. Markov - 1962 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 27 (2):244-244.

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