Self-concern from Priestley to Hazlitt

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (3):499 – 507 (2003)
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Abstract

himself or a proper object of his egoistic self-concern. Hazlitt concluded that belief in personal identity must be an acquired imaginary conception and that since in reality each of us is no more related to his or her future self than to the future self of any other person none of us is 2 ‘

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Raymond Martin
Union College

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Hazlitt on the Future of the Self.Raymond Martin & John Barresi - 1995 - Journal of the History of Ideas 56 (3):463.
Extending self-consciousness into the future.John Barresi - 2001 - In Chris Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. pp. 141-161.

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