Abstract

Gödel’s completeness theorem is concerned with provability, while Girard’s theorem in ludics (as well as full completeness theorems in game semantics) are concerned with proofs. Our purpose is to look for a connection between these two disciplines. Follow- ing a previous work 3, we consider an extension of the original ludics with contraction and universal nondeterminism, which play dual roles, in order to capture a polarized fragment of linear logic and thus a constructive variant of classical propositional logic. We then prove a completeness theorem for proofs in this extended setting: for any behaviour (formula) A and any design (proof attempt) P, either P is a proof of A or there is a model M of A {$\perp$} which defeats P. Compared with proofs of full completeness in game semantics, ours exhibits a striking similarity with proofs of G\"odel’s completeness, in that it explicitly constructs a countermodel essentially using K\"onig’s lemma, proceeds by induction on formulas, and implies an analogue of L\"owenheim-Skolem theorem.