Grounding Responsibility

Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 110 (4):491-503 (2024)
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Abstract

The paper first analyzes some relevant passages from Kant’s essay On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns and his understanding of the right of necessity in the Metaphysics of Morals and in the essay On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory But It Won’t Work in Practice, in order to reflect on the more general question of whether it is possible from the Kantian point of view to allow legitimate exceptions to the moral principle. It then focuses on some aspects of Hegel’s theory of action in the Outlines of the Philosophy of Right to emphasize his attention to the context and consequences of action and then show how Hegel addresses or would address the same problems related to responsibility in cases of exception from the commonly valid and accepted moral and legal norm. This will bring to light two different perspectives with respect to how to ground responsibility, which still provide important insights today.

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2024-11-26

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