Self‐Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz's Law

Noûs 52:900-920 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that an individual has aspects numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other. This discernibility of identicals does not violate Leibniz's Law, however, which concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects. They are not in its domain of quantification. To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases, but the best way to start is to recognize them experientially. We can feel the conflicts within ourselves. In doing so we can feel some of our aspects. I will try to enhance our understanding of the concept of aspect by listing and formalizing some principles for its use. After that I will argue that all sorts of individual things have aspects, not just people who are conflicted.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Oneness, Aspects, and the Neo-Confucians.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2017 - In Philip J. Ivanhoe, Owen Flanagan, Victoria S. Harrison, Hagop Sarkissian & Eric Schwitzgebel, The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self. New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press.
Instance Is the Converse of Aspect.Boris Hennig - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):3-20.
Leibniz and the ‘petites réflexions’.Sebastian Bender - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (4):619-645.
A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.Chiara Brozzo - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):683-697.
Instantiation as Partial Identity.José Tomás Alvarado Marambio - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (4):459-487.
Prior on Leibniz's Law.Jack Nelson - 1970 - Analysis 30 (3):92 - 94.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-03-31

Downloads
939 (#24,817)

6 months
167 (#25,128)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Donald L. M. Baxter
University of Connecticut

References found in this work

Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.
The souls of Black folk.W. E. B. Du Bois - 1987 - Oxford University Press.

View all 44 references / Add more references