How to read minds

In Sarah Richmond, Geraint Rees & Sarah J. L. Edwards (eds.), I know what you're thinking: brain imaging and mental privacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 41 (2012)
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Abstract

Most animals have mental states of one sort or another, but few species share our capacity for self-awareness. We are aware of our own mental states via introspection, and we are aware of the mental states of our fellow human beings on the basis of what they do and say. This chapter is not concerned with these traditional forms of mind-reading—forms whose origins predate the beginnings of recorded history—but with the prospects of a rather different and significantly more recent form of ‘mind-reading’: the capacity to reliably ascribe mental states to a creature on the basis of information derived from information about their brain states.

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Tim Bayne
Monash University

Citations of this work

How Do We Conduct Fruitful Ethical Analysis of Speculative Neurotechnologies?Lucie White - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 10 (1):1-4.

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References found in this work

The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.

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