Existential Risk, Astronomical Waste, and the Reasonableness of a Pure Time Preference for Well-Being

The Monist 107 (2):157-175 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper, we argue that our moral concern for future well-being should reduce over time due to important practical considerations about how humans interact with spacetime. After surveying several of these considerations (around equality, special duties, existential contingency, and overlapping moral concern) we develop a set of core principles that can both explain their moral significance and highlight why this is inherently bound up with our relationship with spacetime. These relate to the equitable distribution of (1) moral concern in a universe that we can only causally affect in one temporal direction; (2) access to the benefits from using spacetime as a resource; and (3) the burdens of care given (1) and (2). We conclude by considering the practical implications of our argument and find that, while it is often assumed that a preference for present over future well-being weakens the case for existential risk mitigation, this likely is not the case.

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Author Profiles

Simon Beard
Cambridge University
Patrick Kaczmarek
University of St. Andrews

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Discounting for public policy: A survey.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (3):391-439.

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