Liars and Heaps: New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox

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Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

Semantic and soritical paradoxes challenge entrenched, fundamental principles about language - principles about truth, denotation, quantification, and, among others, 'tolerance'. Study of the paradoxes helps us determine which logical principles are correct. So it is that they serve not only as a topic of philosophical inquiry but also as a constraint on such inquiry: they often dictate the semantic and logical limits of discourse in general. Sixteen specially written essays by leading figures in the field offer new thoughts and arguments about the paradoxes.

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Jc Beall
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Supervaluationism and Its Logics.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):633-676.
Disquotationalism, reference, and object dependence.Anthony Everett - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):939-955.

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