The incoherence of empiricism

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138 (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory). Moderate rationalism, by contrast, avoids self-defeat.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Epistemology Without Intuition.Manhal Hamdo - 2018 - International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities 3 (10):49-53.
Epistemic Norms and Self Defeat: A Reply to Littlejohn.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (2):26-32.
Rational intuition: Bealer on its nature and epistemic status.Ernest Sosa - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
2,565 (#4,189)

6 months
251 (#9,374)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

George Bealer
Yale University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references