Explicating Top-­‐Down Causation Using Networks and Dynamics

Philosophy of Science 84 (2):253-274 (2017)
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Abstract

In many fields in the life sciences investigators refer to downward or top-down causal effects. Craver and Bechtel defended the view that such cases should be understood in terms of a constitution relation between levels in a mechanism and causation as solely an intra-level relation. Craver and Bechtel, however, provided insufficient specification as to when entities constitute a higher-level mechanism. In this paper I appeal to graph-theoretic representations of networks that are now widely employed in systems biology and neuroscience to identify mechanisms with the modules that exhibit high clustering. As a result of the interconnections of nodes in these modules/mechanisms, they often exhibit complex dynamic behaviors that constrain how the individual components respond to external inputs, an important feature of cases viewed as involving top-down causation.

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William Bechtel
University of California, San Diego

References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Top-down causation without top-down causes.Carl F. Craver & William Bechtel - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):547-563.
Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine.N. Wiener - 1948 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:578-580.

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