Thought experiments and personal identity in africa

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):239-452 (2021)
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Abstract

African perspectives on personhood and personal identity and their relation to those of the West have become far more central in mainstream Western discussion than they once were. Not only are African traditional views with their emphasis on the importance of community and social relations more widely discussed, but that emphasis has also received much wider acceptance and gained more influence among Western philosophers. Despite this convergence, there is at least one striking way in which the discussions remain apart and that is on a point of method. The Western discussion makes widespread use of thought experiments. In the African discussion, they are almost entirely absent. In this article, we put forward a possible explanation for the method of thought experiment being avoided that is based on considerations stemming from John Mbiti’s account of the traditional African view of time. These considerations find an echo in criticism offered of the method in the Western debate. We consider whether a response to both trains of thought can be found that can further bring the Western and African philosophical traditions into fruitful dialogue.

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Simon Beck
University of the Western Cape

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References found in this work

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Real people. Personal identity without thought experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1989 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 179 (4):632-633.

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