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Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics
Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083 (2010)
Abstract
Here I examine the major theories of ethical intuitions, focusing on the epistemic status of this class of intuitions. We cover self-evidence theory, seeming-state theory, and some of the recent contributions from experimental philosophy.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Clarifying ethical intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
Generics, generalism, and reflective equilibrium: Implications for moral theorizing from the study of language.Adam Lerner & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):366-403.
Intuitions, Rationalizations, and Justification: A Defense of Sentimental Rationalism.Frank Hindriks - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):195-216.
Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.
References found in this work
The Right and the Good. Some Problems in Ethics.William David Ross - 1930 - Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by Philip Stratton-Lake.
The methods of ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1884 - Bristol, U.K.: Thoemmes Press. Edited by Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones.
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