A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts

In Pranab K. Bardhan (ed.), The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Oxford University Press UK (1989)
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Abstract

Compares and contrasts the solutions yielded by principal‐agent and bargaining formulations of a tenancy contract.

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10.1093/0198287623.003.0004

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