Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705-712 (2007)
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Abstract

Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox, a book that is richly endowed with interesting analyses and original theses, chooses to ignore both the prosentential theory of truth from Grover, Camp and Belnap 1975 and the revision theory in its book form, Gupta and Belnap 1993. There is no discussion of either theory, nor even any mention of them in the list of references. I offer a pair of quotes chosen from among a number of T&P generalizations that Maudlin would doubtless have modified if RTT had been on his mind at the time of composition of T&P. “…every acceptable account of truth seems to imply that the TInferences must be valid”. My response is that the revision theory of truth is built on an explicit denial of this. Rather than taking them as “valid,” RTT takes the T-Inferences as stage-of-revision-shifting revision principles in the context of a definitional account of truth. “…most discussions of the Liar paradox and related paradoxes…do not address [such questions as]…where [T&P’s] Proof Lambda and Proof Gamma go wrong”. In fact, RTT is not open to this criticism. It’s simple natural-deduction calculus C0 addresses exactly such questions.

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Nuel Belnap
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Základy explikace sémantických pojmů [Foundations of Explication of Semantic Concepts.Jiří Raclavský - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (4):488-505.
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References found in this work

A Prosentential theory of truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.
Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy Grover - 1992 - Princeton University Press.
Truth and Paradox.Anil Gupta - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):735-736.
Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles.Tim Maudlin - 2004 - Studia Logica 85 (2):277-281.

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