Abstract

Feminist theorists have long recognized the social and political power of emotions, and they have frequently noted that these same emotions are often dismissed, especially when they are expressed by the oppressed. My aim in this paper is to offer a general account of the wrong of affective dismissal and consider whether this wrong might, in some circumstances, be understood as a kind of affective injustice. I begin by making a few observations about anger and its assessment. I then turn to the phenomenon of being dismissed and consider one influential attempt to make sense of it. After a brief interlude in which I introduce what I see as the most plausible account of valuing, I argue that affective dismissal is wrong because it displays utter disrespect for persons as valuers. In the last section of the essay, I consider whether affective dismissal should be understood as a type of affective injustice. I ultimately argue that existing accounts of affective injustice are vulnerable to objection, and I sketch an alternative.