Abstract

In this thesis I attribute to Plato an epistemological theory which pervades his epistemological discussions from his earlier definitional dialogues to his latest written works and whose underlying presuppositions, on the one hand, result in a certain conflict or tension and, on the other hand, place Plato squarely in the epistemological tradition stretching from the Stoics through Descartes to such twentieth century epistemologists as Prichard and Cook Wilson. The first of these underlying presuppositions is the tendency to view episteme as a narrow mental state. After attempting to offer a clear account of this notion which has received attention in recent discussions by Putnam, Stich, Burge, Fodor, Kim, and Lewis, I suggest that both Plato's tendency to picture the psyche as a wax tablet and the mental state of episteme as a distinct impression in the wax tablet, as well as his tendency to view episteme as introspectible suggest a tendency on Plato's part to view episteme as a narrow mental state. The second of these underlying presuppositions is the tendency to view episteme as entailing the truth of its object. The evidence for this presupposition is relatively straightforward once it is seen that I intend it to be neutral with respect to the question whether Plato permitted entities or propositions or both to be objects of episteme. When these two presuppositions are combined with the third presupposition to the effect that truth according to Plato is a realistic notion similar to the notions recently discussed by, for example, Field, Devitt, and Boyd, a certain conflict or tension results. Finally, after carefully examining the nature of this conflict or tension, I suggest that it can be avoided by an appropriate restriction of the objects of episteme. I, then, argue that Plato's doctrine that one can have episteme only of the Forms is just such a restriction, and so the tension which we found in Plato's epistemological theory is resolved by means of this doctrine, though in a less than satisfying way