Why the exclusion problem seems intractable and how, just maybe, to tract it

Noûs 37 (3):471-97 (2003)
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Abstract

The basic form of the exclusion problem is by now very, very familiar. 2 Start with the claim that the physical realm is causally complete: every physical thing that happens has a sufficient physical cause. Add in the claim that the mental and the physical are distinct. Toss in some claims about overdetermination, give it a stir, and voilá—suddenly it looks as though the mental never causes anything, at least nothing physical. As it is often put, the physical does all the work, and there is nothing left for the mental to do

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Karen Bennett
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
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