A new argument from actualism to serious actualism

Noûs 30 (3):356-359 (1996)
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Abstract

Actualism is the thesis that necessarily everything that there is exists. Serious actualism is the thesis that necessarily no object has a property in a world in which it does not exist. In this paper I present a new argument from actualism to serious actualism

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Michael Bergmann
Purdue University

Citations of this work

Some Ways the Ways the World Could Have Been Can’t Be.Christopher James Masterman - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (4):997-1025.
Actualism.Christopher Menzel - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Predication.Bruno Jacinto - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):471-499.
Essays in the metaphysics of modality.Alvin Plantinga & Matthew Davidson - 1969 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew Davidson.
A Defence of Lucretian Presentism.Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):675-690.

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