Categorial Justification: Normative Argumentation in Hegel's Practical Philosophy
Dissertation, New School for Social Research (
1983)
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Abstract
This study analyzes the distinctive character of normative argumentation in Hegel's practical philosophy. The fulfillment of this normative intention, construed as a characteristic feature of practical philosophy, depends upon the possibility of justification, that is, the validation of contents in light of ultimate criteria which have a validity of their own. Hegel's own approach to the problem--categorial justification--comprises an analysis of the logic of fundamental normativity and its extension to the field of practical philosophy. This approach is exhibited specifically in his conception of Rechtsphilosophie, and more comprehensively in his conception of philosophy as system, i.e. the reconstruction and justification of categories, of which Rechtsphilosophie is a part. Given the central importance of Hegel's phenomenological and logical theories for this conception of philosophy as system, an investigation of the strategy of categorial justification in Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie requires the prior clarification of these core theories. ;The presentation of Hegel's conception of categorial justification is prepared by an introductory analysis of the alternative of moral justification; this approach, defined by the questions of whether ultimate criteria for justification exist and how they can be known, finds expression in recent linguistic and analytic presentations of metaethics, and consequently, in the metaethically construed versions of classical and modern natural right. An analysis of the difficulties inherent in this approach to the problem of fundamental normativity provides an appropriate introduction to the Hegelian approach, since the latter proceeds precisely from an immanent criticism of the metaphysical and epistemological orientation of moral justification. Categorial justification, it will be argued, thus succeeds in avoiding the difficulties arising from that orientation; since, however, it is considered only in contrast to that one alternative, any judgment of its superiority is necessarily restricted