Hume’s Law: An Essay on Moral Reasoning [Book Review]

Hume Studies 31 (1):177-180 (2005)
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Abstract

Much has been written about Hume’s infamous statement that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is,” leading many readers to wonder whether there is anything new to say about it. Salwén’s discussion of “Hume’s Law” shows that not only is there something new to say about the topic, but also that there is much more work to be done on it. His stated purpose is “to assess the tenability and significance of Hume’s law” by exploring the different ways it can be interpreted and the implications each interpretation has for broader issues in meta-ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language.

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Lorraine L. Besser
Middlebury College

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