Abstract

Resumen Es por demás conocida la crítica que Aristóteles presenta en el libro VII de Ética nicomaquea al así llamado "intelectualismo socrático", según el cual nadie actúa de modo tal que su acción resulte en un mal a sabiendas, es decir, voluntariamente. Si algo así ocurriere, se explicaría porque el agente ignoraba que estaba haciendo un mal. Aristóteles objeta, como es sabido, la incompatibilidad que tal teoría presenta con losAristotelian criticism of the so called "Socratic intellectualism" in Nicomaquean Ethics VII is well known. However, on many occasions Aristotle gives part of reason to the Socratic position. The aim of this work is twofold: to review a specific aspect of the way in which Aristotle may have understood Socratic intellectualism specially regarding someone who is actually knowing that what he or she is aboutto do is wrong; to review why, in that specific aspect, Aristotle's own position is not, as is often said, so distant from the Socratic.