The Supposed Asymmetry between Falsification and Verification

Dialectica 32 (1):29-40 (1978)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

SummaryOn purely logical grounds, if hypothesis H can be eliminated, then so too must its logical complement, H', be confirmed. The Asymmetry Theory, if true, must therefore be not formal but substantial. This cannot be established by the “two‐tier” view which requires symmetrical generalisation of theory terms and observation data. Even singular observations before being usable require a theory of accidents, a theory of errors, already built in to them before they can falsify hypotheses. This explains the inconsistency of Popper's Simplicity criterion and his notion of a priori probability. Conclusion: Falsificationists cannot condemn verifiability without condemning themselves at the same time

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,553

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-21

Downloads
26 (#866,323)

6 months
8 (#633,132)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Falsification et induction.Sylvain Auroux - 1981 - Dialogue 20 (2):281-307.
A draft for unifying controversies in philosophy of science.A. Polikarov - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (2):225-244.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references