Is evidence non-inferential?

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265 (2004)
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Abstract

Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry.

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10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00350.x

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Alexander James Bird
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
No Evidence is False.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.

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References found in this work

The role of trust in knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.
Subjective and objective confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
Knowledge as evidence.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):1-25.
Testimony and Observation.C. A. J. Coady - 1973 - American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (2):149-155.
Domain of discourse.Christopher Gauker - 1997 - Mind 106 (421):1-32.

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