Kantian Reasons for Reasons

Ratio 20 (3):264-277 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Rüdiger Bittner has recently argued against a Kantian ‘maxims account’ of reasons for action. In this paper I argue—against Bittner—that Kantian maxims are not to be understood as reasons for action, but rather as reasons for reasons. On the interpretation presented here, Kantian maxims are the reasons for an agent’s being motivated by whatever more immediate reasons actually motivate her. This understanding of Kantian maxims suggests a recognizably realist Kantian position in ethics.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Maxims in Kant's practical philosophy.Richard R. McCarty - 2006 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1):65-83.
Kant's Theory of Motivation and Rational Agency.Paula Satne - 2009 - Dissertation, The University of Manchester
Moral Considerations and Reasons for Action.Montey Gene Holloway - 1981 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
Kant’s Contextualism.Katrin Flikschuh - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (4):555-579.
Kant on Despondent Moral Failure.Kate Moran - 2023 - Kantian Review 28 (1):125-141.
Unity of Reasons.Adam Cureton - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):877-895.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
642 (#43,926)

6 months
71 (#86,411)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Noell Birondo
University of Texas at El Paso

Citations of this work

Mexico Unveiled: Resisting Colonial Vices and Other Complaints.Carlos Pereda & Noell Birondo - 2025 - Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. Translated by Noell Birondo.
Kant-Bibliographie 2007.Margit Ruffing - 2009 - Kant Studien 100 (4):526-564.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Maxims and virtues.Talbot Brewer - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):539-572.

Add more references