Abstract

This essay argues that once we enter into a relationship with a companion animal or animals we acquire direct moral duties to our non-human companions. The basic contention of this essay is that our direct duties are derived from our own autonomous decision to enter into a human-animal relationship. While, as Kant argued, we have indirect duties to non-human animals grounded in our duty to ourselves to maintain and protect our own humanity, it is furthered argued that we also have direct duties to our non-human companions grounded in our autonomous decision to enter into a human-animal relationship.This essay discusses the specific duties we have to aging companion animals and companion animals who become ill. In terms of health and illness it is argued that the “best interest standard” be employed in order to make medical decisions concerning our companion animals. Our duties in relation to preventive, curative, and palliative care are discussed in terms of what is owed to our companion animals based on a consideration of their “best interest.” Special attention is given to the unique characteristics of non-human animals in terms of how they perceive and are affected by various health care procedures performed in veterinarian medicine including the increased anxiety they often experience due to our inability to explain various procedures to them. The focus of this essay then shifts the discussion to our duties to aging animals. A variety of conditions that affect aging animals are discussed along with our duty to provide treatment. Special attention is paid to arthritis, special dietary needs, and physical frailty. My own aging rescued equine Dusty Rose is discussed in order to provide a practical application of those duties in relation to illness and aging in our companion animals. Finally, the conditions under which we have a duty to provide veterinary administered euthanasia are discussed in terms of the “best interest” of our companion animal and the final duties we owe them at the time of death.