Librationist Closures of the Paradoxes

Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4):323-361 (2012)
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Abstract

We present a semi-formal foundational theory of sorts, akin to sets, named librationism because of its way of dealing with paradoxes. Its semantics is related to Herzberger’s semi inductive approach, it is negation complete and free variables (noemata) name sorts. Librationism deals with paradoxes in a novel way related to paraconsistent dialetheic approaches, but we think of it as bialethic and parasistent. Classical logical theorems are retained, and none contradicted. Novel inferential principles make recourse to theoremhood and failure of theoremhood. Identity is introduced à la Leibniz-Russell, and librationism is highly non-extensional. Π 1 1 -comprehension with ordinary Bar-Induction is accounted for (to be lifted). Power sorts are generally paradoxical, and Cantor’s Theorem is blocked as a camouflaged premise is naturally discarded

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Frode Alfson Bjørdal
University of Oslo

Citations of this work

All Properties are Divine or God exists.Frode Bjørdal - 2018 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 3 (27):329-350.

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References found in this work

Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
The incompleteness theorems.Craig Smorynski - 1977 - In Jon Barwise (ed.), Handbook of mathematical logic. New York: North-Holland. pp. 821 -- 865.
Semantics and the liar paradox.Albert Visser - 1989 - Handbook of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):617--706.
How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.

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