Causation and the Time-Asymmetry of Knowledge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (4):959-977 (2024)
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Abstract

This paper argues that the knowledge asymmetry (the fact that we know more about the past than the future) can be explained as a consequence of the causal Markov condition. The causal Markov condition implies that causes of a common effect are generally statistically independent, whereas effects of a common cause are generally correlated. I show that together with certain facts about the physics of our world, the statistical independence of causes severely limits our ability to predict the future, whereas correlations between joint effects make it so that no such limitation holds in the reverse temporal direction. In so far as the fact that our world conforms to the causal Markov condition can itself be explained in terms of the initial conditions of the universe, my view is compatible with Albert’s well-known account of the origins of temporal asymmetries, but also provides a more illuminating way to derive the knowledge asymmetry from those initial conditions.

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Thomas Blanchard
Université Bordeaux Montaigne

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References found in this work

Time and Chance.David Z. Albert - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Two accounts of laws and time.Barry Loewer - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):115-137.
Asymmetries in Time.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Noûs 24 (5):804-806.
The Statistical Nature of Causation.David Papineau - 2022 - The Monist 105 (2):247-275.

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