Solving the problem of easy knowledge

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge: they allow us to know far too easily that certain sceptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are. This problem is a result of the theories' interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified. I argue that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible epistemic closure principle can solve the problem of easy knowledge. My solution offers a uniform and more successful response to different versions of the problem of easy knowledge

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,401

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
307 (#93,771)

6 months
13 (#197,488)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tim Black
California State University, Northridge

References found in this work

Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:57-89.
How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
Epistemic circularity: Malignant and benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.

View all 11 references / Add more references