Abstract

The first book of the De anima contains Aristotle’s psychological doxography. It is usually divided into two sections: the mere listing of the previous theories on the soul (I.2) and their critical examination (I.3–5). Despite such apparent neatness, various discrepancies emerge and the structure of the doxography remains obscure. To account for such problems and for the general agenda of the psychological doxography, I shall propose a tripartite model, arguing that Aristotle’s grouping of his predecessors’ theories is based on three criteria (motion, cognition and incorporeality), all of which are to be referred back to one overarching criterion (primacy). After collecting some textual evidence in favour of this interpretation, I shall deal with an apparent difficulty faced by the suggested model, namely chapter 4. Based on the results thus reached, I conclude that the doxography of De anima i significantly contributes to the development of Aristotle’s own psychological theory and to defining its role within his wider philosophical project.