Does Bodily Pain Have an Intentional Character? Robert Kilwardby’s Answer

In Isabelle Chouinard, Zoe McConaughey, Aline Medeiros Ramos & Roxane Noël (eds.), Women’s Perspectives on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 255-265 (2021)
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Abstract

The main claim I defend in this paper is that Robert Kilwardby, a thirteenth-century Dominican philosopher, construed bodily pain as a fully-fledged intentional state of the sensory soul. To prove this, I first examine Kilwarby’s account of how pain comes to be and how the sensory soul experiences it. I then show that pain cannot be reduced to a feeling the sensory soul experiences for the simple reason that pain has representational content, and is thus also directed at something.

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10.1007/978-3-030-73190-8_17

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