Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious Differences

Hume Studies 41 (2):105-135 (2015)
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Abstract

Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke’s distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume’s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to answer questions of moral accountability and Hume’s discussion of the self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. In response to the puzzle I show that Locke and Hume hold different moral and religious views and these differences are important to explain why their theories of personal identity differ.

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Ruth Boeker
University College Dublin

Citations of this work

Locke on Persons and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Locke on Being Self to My Self.Ruth Boeker - 2021 - In Patricia Kitcher, The Self: A History. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 118–144.
David Hume on the Corporeal Dimension of the Self.Vinícius França - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (3):489-508.

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References found in this work

Against Narrativity.Galen Strawson - 2004 - Ratio 17 (4):428-452.
Locke on personal identity.Kenneth Winkler - 1991 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (2):201-226.
The misfortunes of virtue.J. B. Schneewind - 1990 - Ethics 101 (1):42-63.
The Self as Narrative in Hume.Lorenzo Greco - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (4):699-722.
Virtue Ethics and Human Nature.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1):67-82.

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