Naming is framing: the public understanding of scientific names

Dissertation, Wageningen University (2018)
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Abstract

Genomics, Climate Change, Nanotechnology, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance… For the uninitiated, scientific names created by experts can be difficult to understand. Yet, people have to make decisions about the related scientific concepts. Experts reach understanding with theory and expect non-experts to do the same. However, my research shows that people can satisfy their need to make sense of what they are dealing with by just using associations triggered by a name. For example, people often unfairly presume that genomics and the controversial genetic manipulation are the same because of their similar names. Resulting beliefs are convincing enough to make decisions and they are difficult to change because activated associations influence further learning. This can cause persistent misunderstandings and unnecessary controversies that can harm scientific developments. By working together, experts and the public can prevent misunderstanding by co-creating names that foster meaningful associations by non-experts and promote appropriate understandings.

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References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331-340.

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