Putting presuppositions on the table: Why the foundations matter

Zygon 41 (2):415-426 (2006)
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Abstract

Abstract. Over time scientists have developed an effective investigative process that includes the acceptance of particular basic presuppositions, methods, content, and theories. T he deeply held presuppositions are the philosophical foundation of scientific thought and do much to define the field’s worldview. These fundamental assumptions can be esoteric for many and can become a source of conflict when they are not commonly shared with other points of view. Such presuppositions affect the observations, the conclusions drawn, and the positions taken. Furthermore, in some cases presuppositions in science have undergone important shifts in meaning, causing an increasing dissonance. We argue that disputes in religion and science often are due to these very basic differences in philosophy that are held by members in the different communities. To better understand the nature of science and its differences with religious views, presuppositions rather than conclusions should be articulated and examined for validity and scope of application.

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The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
The triple helix: gene, organism, and environment.Richard C. Lewontin - 2000 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Edited by Richard C. Lewontin.

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