Content and Self-Knowledge

In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press (2000)
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Abstract

This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties.

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original Boghossian, Paul (1989) "Content and self-knowledge". Philosophical Topics 17(1):5-26
reprint Boghossian, Paul (1989) "Content and self-knowledge". In Hill, Christopher S., Philosophy of Mind, pp. 5--26: University of Arkansas Press (1989)

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Paul Boghossian
New York University

Citations of this work

The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
Externalism and Knowledge of Content.John Gibbons - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):287.
The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):916-935.

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