Moral Risk and Communicating Consent

Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (2):179-207 (2019)
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Abstract

In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating that one consents is sufficient for consent, but also generates robust constraints on what sorts of behaviors can be taken as consent- communicating.

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Renee Jorgensen
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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References found in this work

Shaping the Normative Landscape.David Owens - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The morality of law.Lon Luvois Fuller - 1969 - New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sex, Lies, and Consent.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):717-744.

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