Access and Unknowable Obligations

Filosofia Unisinos 23 (3):1-16 (2022)
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Abstract

The article is devoted to the question of whether unknowable obligations are possible. According to the popular view (known as Access), an act is obligatory only if its agent can know that this act is obligatory. Sorensen (1995) argues against Access, and Sider and Wieland both defend Access by suggesting (S) – For any obligation O, individual X must refrain from making O unknowable. We consider various difficulties concerning the possibility of (S) – an infinite regress, self-referential nature of (S), unprovability of (S). It is argued that (S), from a certain perspective, is itself the unknowable obligation. Keywords: Obligations, access, regress, self-reference.

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