Defaulting on Reasons

Noûs:229-259 (2018)
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10.1111/nous.12165

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Daniel Bonevac
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Logic 21 (2):47-63.
Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Particularism for Generalists: A Rossian Business Ethic.J. Drake - 2021 - Business Ethics Quarterly 31 (4):600-622.

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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.

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