Reasons to act and the mental representation of consequentialist aberrations

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):453-454 (2007)
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Abstract

If imagination is guided by the same principles as rational thoughts, then we ought not to stop at the way people make inferences to get insights about the workings of imagination; we ought to consider as well the way they make rational choices. This broader approach accounts for the puzzling effect of reasons to act on the mutability of actions

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10.1017/s0140525x07002592

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Norms in Counterfactual Selection.Sina Fazelpour - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):114-139.

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