Abstract

Only recently has the concept of the Other become the object of intense philosophical interest. In "Classical Philosophy," it was more or less ignored. During the Middle Ages and as late as the Eighteenth Century, if writers addressed the problem at all, they did so in a cursory manner, assuming, and often arguing, that the Other can be "known" by analogy, or that he is a "creation" of the self. The lack of attention to this concept notwithstanding, a certain viewpoint regarding the Other was presupposed in discussions of moral philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology. The first part of this dissertation provides background for the examination of the concept as viewed by various philosophers, with special emphasis on those who contended with it explicitly. Through a better understanding of the difficulties which the concept presents, one is able to comprehend divers ontological theories of self, personality, human consciousness, and interpersonal relations. ;In Part II, the Other in the ontology of Sartre is examined in detail. At first, his phenomenological explication is presented with little or no commentary. Familiarity with Sartre's neologisms and with the rudiments of his system are prerequisite for the apprehension of his subtle arguments regarding the self and the Other. Therefore, key elements of his ontology, such as "in-itself" and "for-itself," "being" and "nothingness," are explained so as to facilitate the grasp of the philosopher's basic notions, e.g., "the look," "shame," "the body," "facticity," as well as more complex problems which issue from concrete relations with an Other. Sartre's argument is evaluated in the last chapter of this section, in regard to its coherence within his own system as well as in comparison with the theories of other writers. ;The Other in the ontology of Buber is examined in Part III. Again, some exposition of the author's philosophy is presented at first, in order to render more accessible the material which concerns directly the concept of the Other. Since Buber did not present his account of this concept in explicit form, several pertinent essays are examined in addition to his classic, I and Thou. The basic attitudes toward the Other, characterized by the word-pairs "I-Thou" and "I-It" are explained within the context of their early formulation by the author and their subsequent elaboration and reinterpretation in his later writings. Buber's essays on philosophical anthropology are carefully examined also, as these contain his most precise articulation of his views on the concept of the Other. Equally informative are the philosopher's comments on ethics and religion. A brief review of these yields significant material for a clearer understanding of dialogical thought. Finally, the comments of major critics of Buber's approach, of ostensible weaknesses in his argument, and of his philosophy in general are presented at the end of this section. ;The Conclusion attempts to juxtapose those elements of the ontologies of Sartre and Buber which lend themselves to such comparison. Both writers manifest a perspicacious understanding of psychology and both describe their observations skillfully. Sartrean Existentialism is found to be more precise in its philosophical formulation and more complete in the number of issues addressed. Buber's philosophy of dialogue points the way to enhanced interpersonal relations. "Authenticity" for Sartre refers the self to its own being. In Buber's account, authentic existence can take place only in the realm between man and man.