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Counterpart theory vindicated: A reply to Merricks
Dialectica 59 (1):67–73 (2005)
Abstract
The paper shows – contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks – that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merrick’s argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Composition is Identity and Mereological Nihilism.Claudio Calosi - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):219-235.
Natural Properties Do Not Support Essentialism in Counterpart Theory: A Reflection on Buras’s Proposal.Cristina Nencha - 2017 - Argumenta 2 (2):281-292.
References found in this work
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
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