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What does Fido believe?
Think 7 (19):7-15 (2008)
Abstract
Lisa Bortolotti introduces the arguments about whether dogs can have beliefsAuthor's Profile
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Lisa Bortolotti, The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs, 2020. [REVIEW]Mandi Astola - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):879-881.
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Citations of this work
La relevancia de ser un sujeto moral. Comentario al artículo de Mark Rowlands “¿Pueden los animales ser morales?”.Olga Campos Serena - 2012 - Dilemata 9:75-82.
The Ethics of Enhancement: Cognitive Inequalities and Sentient Animals.Olga Campos Serena - 2016 - Ramon Llull Journal of Applied Ethics 7 (7):71-91.
References found in this work
Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues.Alasdair Macintyre - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):225-229.
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need The Virtues.Alasdair Macintyre - 1999 - Environmental Values 9 (2):259-261.
What thought requires.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 121.
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