Interpretative dilemmas

Abstract

In this paper I claim that the reason we are reluctant to call many informal fallacies fallacies of relevance is because we can interpret them as providing contextual information about how the argument is to be interpreted. This interpretative dilemma is that the logical form is determined in part by whether the analyst wishes to be charitable to the proponent or the opponent. The evaluation of the argument is nonetheless purely logical.

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David Botting
De La Salle University (PhD)

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References found in this work

Coalescent argumentation.Michael A. Gilbert - 1995 - Argumentation 9 (5):837-852.
The One Fallacy Theory.Lawrence H. Powers - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (2).
Can 'Big' Questions be Begged?David Botting - 2011 - Argumentation 25 (1):23-36.
The De Re, the Per Se, the Knowable, and the Known.David Botting - 2011 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (2):191.

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