On a supposed contradiction in Hume

Philosophy 82 (4):643-646 (2007)
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Abstract

One of the most powerful arguments in meta-ethics today is that of Treatise, Book 3, in which Hume seeks to show that morality's practical influence precludes its being based on reason. H.O. Mounce, in his review of my Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction, rejects my central contention that this argument contains a contradiction. This review is however flawed on several counts.

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Sophie Botros
University of London

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Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Philosophy 69 (267):114-116.
Hume’s Moral Epistemology.Jonathan Harrison - 1976 - Philosophy 52 (202):491-493.

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