Abstract

This dissertation undertakes a moral inquiry into the right to religious freedom that draws upon a critical examination of John Locke's writings on the subject. Two central theses are defended. The first is that Locke provides a justification for the right to religious freedom that appeals to the value of individuals practicing a sincere religion; the second, is that Locke's justification forms the basis for an attractive account of this right that is of contemporary relevance. In defending these two theses, the dissertation is structured as follows. ;Chapter one outlines the conceptual terrain of the inquiry by defining what the right to religious freedom involves, and by providing a critical survey of several types of justification for this right. After rejecting these justifications, I turn to a discussion of Locke's views on religious freedom in chapters two through four. Each of these chapters focuses on one text by Locke: Two Tracts on Government , An Essay on Toleration and the Letter Concerning Toleration . By placing Locke's views about sincerity and religion at the center of his writings on religious freedom, I suggest that we are able to gain new insights into his settled convictions about religious freedom. Chapter five then draws upon this interpretation of Locke to develop an independent account of the right to religious freedom. This account holds that the right to religious freedom is justified to the extent that it protects the value of integrity. A person's integrity depends on his being able to live in line with his moral duties as he sees these for himself. Since the moral duties a person sees for himself may be religious, the value of integrity can ground a right to freedom of religious conduct. ;Like Locke's appeal to sincere religion, my account grounds the right to religious freedom in the value of the motivational dimension of a person's religious experience. In both cases, special importance is accorded to an individual's ability to fulfill his own conception of his moral duties, and it is argued that the law should accommodate conduct so motivated