Determinism, Freedom, and Self-Referential Arguments

Review of Metaphysics 26 (1):3-37 (1972)
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Abstract

For this reason, proponents of free choice have attempted to find grounds for a refutation of determinism in the determinist position itself. Such attempts have sometimes taken the form of argumentation—by now well known—that determinism is somehow self-refuting or self-defeating.

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Citations of this work

The Virtue of Freedom in Capitalism.Tibor R. Machan - 1986 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 3 (1):49-58.
Skepticism and Transcendental Arguments.Jeffrey Stewart Tlumak - 1975 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Hampshire, Mount Holyoke and Smith Colleges

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