Conceptual content and discursive practice

Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):13-35 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper discusses the integrated approach to the semantics and pragmatics of language developed in my Making It Explicit . The core claim is that there are six consequential relations among commitments and entitlements that are sufficient for a practice exhibiting them to qualify as discursive, that is, as a practice of giving and asking for reasons, hence as one conferring genuinely conceptual content on the expressions, performances, and statuses that have scorekeeping significances in those practices. I divide the six consequential relations into two groups, the fundamental-semantic and the social-pragmatic, and I characterise the complex interactions between them. The bold and potentially falsifiable overall claim is that any practice that exhibits this full six-fold structure will be interpretable in a broadly Davidsonian sense: roughly, mappable onto ours in a way that makes conversation with us possible

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Robert Brandom
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Can Animals Act For Reasons?Hans-Johann Glock - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):232-254.
Keep score and punish: Brandom’s concept of responsibility.Frieder Vogelmann - 2020 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 46 (8):922-941.
Brandom and the Second Person.Glenda Satne - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (2):189-209.

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