Abstract

In part XII of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, the character Philo abruptly changes his tone. My dissertation seeks to explain this. At the start of that final section of the Dialogues, Philo confesses that when he considers the beauty of order in nature, he cannot help believing that the universe is intelligently designed. This confession is surprising because Philo had sought to undermine the design argument in parts II--XI, yet he now seems to acknowledge the continued force of that argument, despite skeptical objections. ;Philo's remarks suggest that Hume thinks it is natural for us to form belief in an intelligent designer of the universe in much the same way he thinks it is natural for us to form beliefs about causal connections, physical objects, beauty and morality. According to Hume, there is no logical foundation for any of the beliefs we form about these things; yet, they are immune to skeptical doubt because they arise not from reason, but from the proper functioning of principles of natural belief formation in the human imagination. ;I identify the principle of natural belief formation that I think Hume holds leads us naturally to believe that the universe is intelligently designed, and I term it 'species-specific.' I argue that Hume thinks this principle leads each species naturally to prefer to explain order in nature in light of the way it as a species brings order about. This means that spiders, if they were to have an opinion about the matter, would prefer instinct as an explanation for order in nature---they would believe that a spider instinctively spun from its bowels the whole world; humans, by contrast, will prefer intelligent design as an explanation. ;In order to find a warrant for such cosmogony preferences, I appeal to Hume's essay, "Of the Standard of Taste." I claim that these species-specific preferences are akin to the unavoidable and blameless predilections he thinks each man has for that writer whose way of thinking most resembles his own. ;To be emphasized, however, are both the highly attenuated content of the religious belief that I argue Hume thinks arises naturally when we apprehend the beauty of natural order, and its improbable character. Consideration of Hume's account of our natural ways of believing indicates that he thinks it is more than likely that the things we naturally believe in do not exist in reality. Thus, Hume thinks that, more than likely, an intelligent designer of the universe does not exist in reality