Should observed overconfidence be dismissed as a statistical artifact? Critique of Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu (1994)

Psychological Review 107 (4):943-946 (2000)
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10.1037/0033-295x.107.4.943

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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).

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