El problema del método de la teoría jurídica contemporánea y la disputa Hart vs. Dworkin

Análisis Filosófico 21 (1):107-148 (2001)
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Abstract

Dworkin´s central argument against positivism casts doubt on its main tenet, viz, that the theory must give an account of law from an external point of view.Dworkin claims that Law is a social practice in which participants develop an interpretive attitude, i.e., they assign a purpose to it without considering other participant´s opinions on that issue. An account of this practice demands interpretation, by adopting the participants´ attitude.The argument is inconsistent with Dworkin´s distinction between levels of interpretation. Participants interpret certain data, and the observer must interpret that social practice. He must therefore consider the participant´s opinions. If he adopted the internal attitude, the task would be unpursuable.Dworkin´s second argument attacks what positivism´s tenet presupposes: propositions about law are different from propositions of law. Dworkin maintains that the distinction is insustainable, as with the distinction between ethics and meta-ethics. Meta-ethical theories that claim externality are inconsistent, since every proposition about morality is supported by moral propositions .However, if meta-ethics is internal to morality, there is at least one external theory about morality: Dworkin´s own analysis. Dworkin´s criticism is of a logical type, since be claims that meta-ethical theories are inconsistent. It must then be meta-linguistic and, hence, external

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